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Abstract PRNU-based image processing is a key asset in
digital multimedia forensics. It allows for reliable device
identification and effective detection and localization of im-
age forgeries, in very general conditions. However, perfor-
mance impairs significantly in challenging conditions in-
volving low quality and quantity of data. These include work-
ing on compressed and cropped images, or estimating the
camera PRNU pattern based on only a few images. To boost
the performance of PRNU-based analyses in such conditions
we propose to leverage the image noiseprint, a recently pro-
posed camera-model fingerprint that has proved effective for
several forensic tasks. Numerical experiments on datasets
widely used for source identification prove that the proposed
method ensures a significant performance improvement in a
wide range of challenging situations.
Keywords Digital image forensics · source identification ·
PRNU · noiseprint
1 Introduction
Image attribution is a fundamental task in the context of dig-
ital multimedia forensics and has gained a great deal of at-
tention in recent years. Being able to identify the specific de-
vice that acquired a given image represents a powerful tool
in the hands of investigators fighting such hideous crimes as
terrorism and pedopornography.
Most successful techniques for device identification rely
on the photo response non-uniformity (PRNU) [1,2], a sort
of fingerprint left by the camera in each acquired photo.
The PRNU pattern originates from subtle random imperfec-
tions of the camera sensor which affect in a deterministic
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way all acquired images. Each device has its specific PRNU
pattern, which can be accurately estimated by means of so-
phisticated processing steps, provided a large number of im-
ages acquired by the device itself is available. Given the
camera PRNU pattern, image attribution is relatively easy
and very reliable, in ideal conditions. However, the perfor-
mance degrades rapidly when the operating conditions are
less favourable, since it is ultimately related to the quantity
of available data and their quality [3]. In particular, perfor-
mance may be severely impaired when i) tests take place
on small image crops, ii) a limited number of images are
available for estimating the device PRNU. These challeng-
ing cases are of great interest for real-world applications, as
clarified in the following.
Modern cameras generate very large images, with mil-
lions of pixels, which provide abundant information for re-
liable device identification. However, often large-scale in-
vestigations are necessary. The analyst may be required to
process a large number of images, for example all images
downloaded from a social account, and look for their prove-
nance in a huge database of available cameras (PRNU pat-
terns). This calls for an inordinate processing time, unless
suitable methods are used to reduce computation, typically
involving some forms of data summarization [4,5,6]. Work-
ing on small crops, rather than on the whole image, is a sim-
ple and effective way to achieve such a goal. In addition, the
PRNU pattern can be also used to perform image forgery lo-
calization [2,7]. In this case, a PRNU-based sliding-window
analysis is necessary, on patches of relatively small size.
Turning to the second problem, it may easily happen, in
criminal investigations, that only a few images acquired by
the camera of interest are available to estimate its PRNU
pattern. Moreover, the number and type of source cameras
may be themselves unknown, and must be estimated in a
blind fashion based on a relatively small set of unlabeled
images [8,9,10,11]. In such cases, one must cope with low-
quality estimation rather than abandoning the effort.
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In this work, we tackle these problems and propose a
novel source identification strategy which improves the per-
formance of PRNU-based methods when only a few, or even
just one image is available for estimation, and when only
small images may be processed. To this end, we rely on a
recent approach for camera model identification [12] and
use it to improve the PRNU-based source device identifica-
tion performance. Camera model identification has received
great attention in recent years, with a steady improvement
of performance, thanks to the availability of huge datasets
on which it is possible to train learning-based detectors, and
the introduction of convolutional neural networks (CNN).
The supervised setting guarantees very good performance
[13][14], especially if deep networks are used. However,
such solutions are highly vulnerable to attacks [15][16]. To
gain higher robustness, unsupervised or semi-supervised me-
thods may be used. For example, in [17] features are ex-
tracted through a CNN, while classification relies on ma-
chine learning methods. Interestingly, only the classification
step needs to be re-trained when testing on camera models
that are not present in the training set. Likewise, in [18] it
has been shown that proper fine-tuning strategies can be ap-
plied to camera model identification, a task that shares many
features with other forensic tasks. Of course, this makes the
problem easier to face, given that in a realistic scenario it
is not possible to include in the training phase all the pos-
sible camera models. A further step in this direction can be
found in [12], where the use of a new fingerprint has been
proposed, called noiseprint, related to camera model arti-
facts and extracted by means of a CNN trained in siamese
modality. Noiseprints can be used in PRNU-like scenarios
but require much less data to reach a satisfactory perfor-
mance [19].
The main idea of this paper is to make use of noise-
prints to support PRNU-based device identification. In fact,
although noiseprints allow only for model identification, they
are much stronger than PRNU patterns, and more resilient to
challenging conditions involving restrictions on the number
and size of images.
In the rest of the paper, after providing background ma-
terial on PRNU and noiseprint in Section II, and describing
the proposed method in Section III, we carry out a thorough
performance analysis, in Section IV, on datasets widely used
in the literature and in several conditions of interest, proving
the potential of the proposed approach. Finally, Section V
concludes the paper.
2 Background
Device-level source identification relies on specific marks
that each individual device leaves on the acquired images.
Barring trivial cases, like the presence of multiple defective
pixels in the sensor, most identification methods resort to
the photo response non-uniformity noise (PRNU) pattern. In
fact, due to unavoidable inaccuracies in sensor manufactur-
ing, sensor cells are not perfectly uniform and generate pix-
els with slightly different luminance in the presence of the
same light intensity. Accordingly, a simplified multiplicative
model for an image I generated by a given camera is
I = (1+K)I0 +Θ (1)
where I0 is the true image, K is the PRNU pattern, Θ ac-
counts for all other sources of noise, and all operations are
pixel-wise. The PRNU is unique for each device, stable in
time, and present in all images acquired by the device itself.
Therefore it can be regarded as a legitimate device finger-
print, and used to perform a large number of forensic tasks
[2,20,7].
The PRNU of camera Ci can be estimated from a suitable
number of images, say, Ii,1, . . . , Ii,N , acquired by the camera
itself. First, noise residuals are computed by means of some
suitable denoising algorithms f (·)
Wi,n = Ii,n− f (Ii,n) (2)
The denoiser removes to a large extent the original image,
I0i,n, regarded as a disturbance here, in order to emphasize
the multiplicative pattern [21]. Then the PRNU, Ki, can be
estimated by plain average
K̂i =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
Wi,n (3)
or according to a maximum-likelihood rule, in order to re-
duce the residual noise. Moreover, to remove unwanted pe-
riodicities, related to JPEG compression or model-based ar-
tifacts, the estimated fingerprint is further filtered by sub-
tracting the averages of each row and column and by using
a Wiener filter in the DFT domain [1,22]. Eventually, the
estimate converges to the true PRNU as N→ ∞.
Assuming to know the true reference PRNU, we can
check if image Im was acquired by camera Ci based on the
normalized cross-correlation (NCC) between Wm and Ki
NCC(Wm,Ki) =
1
‖Wm‖ · ‖Ki‖〈Wm,Ki〉 (4)
with 〈·, ·〉 and ‖ · ‖ indicating inner product and Euclidean
norm, respectively. The computed NCC will be a random
variable, due to all kinds of disturbances, with a positive
mean if the image was taken by camera Ci, and zero mean
otherwise. In the following, to allow easier interpretation,
we present results in terms of a PRNU-based pseudo- dis-
tance, defined as the complement to 1 of NCC
DPRNU(i,m) = 1−NCC(Wm,Ki) (5)
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Fig. 1 Using a Siamese architecture for training. The output of one
CNN takes the role of desired (same model and position) or undesired
(different models or positions) reference for the other twin CNN.
Methods based on PRNU have shown excellent perfor-
mance for source identification [2] in ideal conditions. How-
ever, the NCC variance increases both with decreasing im-
age size and when the number of images used to estimate the
real PRNU decreases, in which cases, decision may become
unreliable. Both conditions may easily occur in real-world
practice, as recalled in the Introduction. Therefore, further
evidence, coming from camera-model features, is highly wel-
come to improve identification performance.
Indeed, it is well known that, besides device-specific tra-
ces, each image bears also model-specific traces, related to
the processes carried inside the camera, such as demosaick-
ing or JPEG compression. Such traces are treated as noise in
the PRNU estimation process, and mostly removed, but they
can provide a precious help to tell apart cameras of different
models.
Recently, a camera-model fingerprint has been proposed
[12], called noiseprint, extracted by means of a suitably trai-
ned convolutional neural network (CNN). A noiseprint is an
image-size pattern, like the PRNU, in which the high-level
scene content is removed and model-related artifacts are em-
phasized. This is obtained by training the CNN in a Siamese
configuration, as illustrated in Fig.1. Two identical versions
of the same net are fed with pairs of patches extracted from
unrelated images. Such pairs have positive label when they
come from the same model and have the same spatial posi-
tion, and negative label otherwise. During training, thanks
to a suitable loss function, the network learns to emphasize
the similarities among positive pairs, that is, the camera mo-
del artifacts. In [12] noiseprints have been shown to enable
the accomplishment of numerous forensic tasks, especially
image forgery localization.
Similarly to the reference PRNU pattern, the reference
noiseprint of a model is obtained by averaging a large num-
ber of noiseprints extracted by images acquired by the same
model (not necessarily the same device) [19], in formulas
Ri =
1
N
N
∑
n=1
φ(Ii,n) (6)
where φ(·) is the function implemented by the CNN, Ri is
the estimated reference pattern of the i-th model and, Ii,n is
Fig. 2 Examples of device fingerprints (PRNU, top) and model fin-
gerprints (noiseprint, bottom) for cameras of the VISION dataset, esti-
mated using 100 images on a crop of dimension 256×256. Device fin-
gerprints are noise-like, weak patterns, all different from one another.
Noiseprints are much stronger, model-specific, periodic patterns. Note
that the last two devices are of the same model and, accordingly, their
noiseprints are almost identical.
the n-th image taken by the i-th model. To verify whether a
given image Im was acquired by camera model Mi, we ex-
tract its noiseprint, φ(Im), and compute the mean square er-
ror (MSE) with respect to the model reference pattern Ri.
For homogeneity with the previous case, this is also called
NP-based distance
DNP(i,m) = MSE(Ri,φ(Im)) (7)
Again DNP(i,m) is expected to be small if the m-th image
was indeed acquired by the i-th model and large otherwise,
and its variance depends, again, on the size and number of
images used to estimate the reference pattern.
While the image noiseprint does not allow to single out
the camera that acquired a given image, it can be used to dis-
card or play down a large number of candidates, that is, all
cameras whose model does not fit the test noiseprint. More-
over, the model-related traces found in noiseprints are much
stronger than the PRNU traces found in image residuals,
as clearly shown in the example of Fig.2, hence noiseprint-
based decisions keep being reliable even over small regions
and when a limited number of images is available for esti-
mation [19].
3 Proposed method
In this work, we want to improve the performance of the
device source identification in the two critical scenarios: i)
only a few images are available to estimate the reference
PRNU pattern; and ii) only a small crop of the image is
used for testing. The few-image scenario accounts for cases
where the physical device is not available, so that the only
available images are recovered from a hard disk or maybe
from a social account of a suspect. Instead, the small-region
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Fig. 3 Histograms of PRNU-based distance, DPRNU (left), and
noiseprint-based distance, DNP (right), on the VISION dataset. N:
number of images used to estimate the reference pattern. d× d: size
of crop used for testing.
scenario is motivated by the need to reduce memory and
time resources for very large-scale analyses. In addition, a
good performance on small regions allows one to use this
approach for image forgery detection and localization, espe-
cially the critical case of small-size forgeries.
In Fig.3, we show the histograms of the PRNU-based
(left) and noiseprint-based (right) distances computed on the
widespread VISION dataset [23] in various situations (dif-
ferent rows). Each subplot shows three different histograms:
1. same-device (green): the distance is evaluated between
an image acquired from camera C of model M and the
reference pattern of the same camera;
2. different-device same-model (blue): the distance is eval-
uated between an image acquired from camera C of mo-
del M and the reference pattern of a different camera C′
of the same model M;
3. different-device different-model (red): the distance is eval-
uated between an image acquired from camera C of mo-
del M and the reference pattern of a different camera C′
of a different model M′.
On the first row, we consider a nearly ideal situation, where
tests are performed on 1024×1024 crops of the image and
there is plenty of images (we limit them to N=100) to esti-
mate the reference patterns. The subplot on the left shows
that the PRNU-based distance separates very well same-de-
vice from different-device samples. On the contrary, the two
different-device distributions (same-model and different- mo-
del) overlap largely, since the PRNU does bear model-specific
information. Then, when the number of images used to es-
timate the reference pattern decreases (second row, N=1)
or the analysis crop shrinks significantly (third row, d=64)
same-device and different-device distributions are not so well
separated anymore, and PRNU-based decisions become un-
reliable. Eventually, in the extreme case of N=1 and d=64
(fourth row), all distributions collapse. The right side of the
figure shows histograms of the noiseprint-based distance. In
the ideal case (top row) we now observe a very good separa-
tion between same-model and different-model histograms,
while the two same-model distributions overlap, as noise-
prints do not carry device-related information. Unlike with
PRNU, however, when the analysis conditions deviate from
ideal (following rows), the same-model and different-model
distributions keep being reasonably well-separated, allow-
ing for a reliable model discrimination even in the worst
case (fourth row). This suggests the opportunity to use the
noiseprint-based distance to support decision insofar differ-
ent models are involved,
In summary, our proposal is to use noiseprint-based mo-
del-related information to support PRNU-based device iden-
tification. Assuming to know the camera model of the im-
age to analyze, the search for the source device can be re-
stricted only to devices of the same model, thereby reducing
the risk of wrong identification, especially in the most crit-
ical cases. However, in real-world scenarios, camera mod-
els may not be known in advance, calling for a preliminary
model identification phase, which is itself prone to errors.
Therefore, with the hierarchical procedure outlined before,
there is the non-negligible risk of excluding right away the
correct device. For this reason, we prefer to exploit the two
pieces of information jointly, rather than hierarchically, by
suitably combining the two distances, as shown pictorially
in Fig.4. Note that, in this worst-case scenario, where no
model-related information is known a priori, the noiseprint
reference pattern is estimated from the very same images
used to estimate the PRNU pattern. Hence, the resulting per-
formance represents a lower bound for more favourable con-
ditions.
We consider the following binary hypothesis test:{
H0 : m-th image not acquired by i-th device.
H1 : m-th image acquired by i-th device.
(8)
and propose three different strategies to combine the two
distances.
SVM: as first strategy, we adopt a linear support-vector ma-
chine (SVM) classifier. Relying on a large dataset of exam-
ples, the SVM finds the hyperplane that best separates sam-
ples of the two hypotheses, maximizing the distance from
the hyperplane to the nearest points of each class. Then, we
use the oriented distance from the hyperplane as a score to
detect the correct device that acquired the image. If a limited
number of candidate devices is given, the maximum-score
device is chosen. Otherwise, the score is compared with a
threshold to make a binary decision, and the threshold itself
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Fig. 4 The PRNU and the noiseprint are estimated from available images of a given camera and the image under test, separately. Thus, the PRNU-
based (DPRNU ) and the noiseprint-based (DNP) pseudo-distances between the test sample and the reference are separately computed and eventually
combined to obtain the final score.
may be varied to obtain a performance curve. These criteria
apply to the following cases as well.
Likelihood-Ratio Test: to formulate a likelihood-ratio test
(LRT), we model DPRNU and DNP as random variables with
jointly Gaussian distribution in both hypotheses{
H0 : (DPRNU ,DNP)∼N (µ0,Σ0)
H1 : (DPRNU ,DNP)∼N (µ1,Σ1)
(9)
The parameters µ0, Σ0, µ1, Σ1 are estimated, for each sit-
uation of interest, on a separate training-set. In particular,
we use two methods to estimate these parameters, the clas-
sical ML approach, and a robust approach based on the min-
imum covariance determinant MCD proposed in [24]. With
this Gaussian model, and the estimated parameters, we can
compute the log-likelihood ratio
Λ(i,m) = log
N (DPRNU (i,m),DNP(i,m) |µ1,Σ1 )
N (DPRNU (i,m),DNP(i,m) |µ0,Σ0 ) (10)
and use it as decision statistic.
Fisher’s Linear Discriminant: this approach looks for the
direction along which the distributions of two classes are
better separated, measuring the separation as the ratio of the
inter-class to intra-class variances. The weight vector of the
optimal direction, wopt, is given by
wopt = argmax
w
(
wTµ1−wTµ0
)2
wT (Σ1 +Σ0)w
∝ (Σ1 +Σ0)−1(µ1−µ0)
(11)
where, again, means and co-variance matrices in the two hy-
potheses, µ0, Σ0, µ1, Σ1, are estimated on a training-set. In
this case, the score is given by the projection of the vector
formed by the two distances along the optimal direction
FLD(i,m) = woptPRNU DPRNU (i,m)+w
opt
NPDNP(i,m) (12)
Make Model #Devices Images size
Canon Ixus 70 3 3072 x 2304
Casio EX-Z150 5 3264 x 2448
Kodak M1063 5 3664 x 2748
FujiFilm FinePixJ50 3 3264 x 2448
Nikon CoolPix S710 5 4352 x 3264
Nikon D200 2 3872 x 2592
Nikon D70/D70s 2/2 3008 x 2000
Olympus µ1050SW 5 3648 x 2736
Panasonic DMC-FZ50 3 3648 x 2736
Pentax Optio A40 4 4000 x 3000
Pratika DCZ5.9 5 2560 x 1920
Ricoh GX100 5 3648 x 2736
Rollei RCP-7325XS 3 3072 x 2304
Samsung L74wide 3 3072 x 2304
Samsung NV15 3 3648 x 2736
Sony DSC-H50 2 3456 x 2592
Sony DSC-T77 4 3648 x 2736
Sony DSC-W170 2 3648 x 2736
Σ 18 66
Table 1 Camera models and devices selected from the Dresden Image
Database used for testing. For each camera, we considered 100 images
to estimate the reference patterns and 50 images for testing.
4 Experiments
In this section, we assess the performance of the proposed
device identification method in all its variants, and in vari-
ous realistic scenarios of interests. We consider two typical
scenarios (Fig.5):
1. closed-set. The set of candidate sources is predefined
and one is required to associate the test image with one
of the devices in the set. Therefore, the task can be re-
garded as a multi-class classification problem. Accord-
ingly, we evaluate the classification performance in terms
of accuracy, that is, probability of correct decision.
2. open-set or verification. The set of candidate sources is
not given a priori. In this case, one can only decide on
whether the test image was acquired by a certain device
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Same
or
Different
Fig. 5 On the left the closed-set scenario where the test image is as-
signed to one of the device in a set of known cameras. In the verifica-
tion or open-set scenario, on the right, the task is to decide if the test
image was acquired by a certain device or not.
or not. Therefore, the problem is now binary classifica-
tion, and we evaluate the classification performance, as
customary, in terms of probability of correct detection
PD and probability of false alarm PFA, summarized by
a receiver operating curve (ROC), computed for vary-
ing decision threshold, and eventually by the area under
such a curve (AUC).
4.1 Datasets
Three different datasets have been employed for our exper-
iments, two for training and one for testing. In fact, in or-
der to avoid any bias, we trained the CNN that extracts the
noiseprints and the source identification classifiers on dis-
joint sets of data. Concerning noiseprints, the network is
trained on a large dataset of images publicly available on
dpreviewer.com. Our collection comprises 625 camera mod-
els, 600 for training the network and 25 for validation, with a
number of images per model ranging from 8 to 173. The pa-
rameters of the source identification classifiers, instead, have
been estimated on the VISION dataset [23], often used for
camera model identification, which comprises images ac-
quired from 29 different models, most of them with only one
device. Finally, tests have been conducted on the Dresden
dataset [25], proposed originally for camera source identi-
fication, comprising images from 25 camera models, 18 of
which featuring two or more different devices. We selected
these latter models with all their devices, for a grand total of
66. Details are reported in Tab.1.
4.2 Results
To assess the source identification performance of the con-
ventional PRNU-only and the proposed PRNU+noiseprint
methods we consider several challenging cases obtained by
varying the size of the image crop used for testing and the
number of images used for estimating the reference patterns.
In addition, we consider also the case of JPEG images com-
pressed at two quality factors, aimed at simulating a sce-
nario in which images are downloaded from social network
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Fig. 6 Scatter plots of the two distances in different conditions on the
VISION dataset. For green points, test image and reference come from
the same device, while for red points, they come from different devices.
Blue lines depict the Gaussian fitting of the two distributions.
accounts, where compression and resizing are routinely per-
formed. Note that the PRNU and noiseprint reference pat-
terns are both estimated from the very same images, since
no prior information is assumed to be available on the cam-
era models.
To gain some insight into the role of the two distances,
Fig.6 shows the scatter plots of DPRNU and DPN for images
of the VISION dataset in the same cases of Fig.3. Here, how-
ever, we only show same-device (green) and different-device
(red) points, irrespective of models. In the most favourable
case of d=1024 and N=100 (top-left), the two clusters can
be separated very effectively by a vertical line, that is, based
only on the PRNU distance. Instead, in the worst case of
d=64 and N=1 (bottom-right), the PRNU-based distance is
basically useless, while the noiseprint-based distance pro-
vides by itself a pretty good separation, with residual errors
mostly due to same-model different-device points. In inter-
mediate cases, both pieces of information help separating
effectively the two clusters. Note that a weak correlation be-
tween the two distances exist for same-device points, likely
due to the imperfect rejection of unwanted contributions. Of
course, a different classifier must be designed for each situ-
ation of interest, based on the corresponding training set.
We now analyze the performance on the test dataset,
Dresden, never used in training, beginning with the closed-
set scenario, Tab.2. On the rows, we consider all combina-
tions of d=64, 256, 1024, and N=1, 10, 100. When N=1 or
10, results are averaged over 10 repetitions with different
reference patterns. The leftmost columns show results for
the two baselines, based only on the PRNU-distance (that is,
the conventional method of [2]) and only on the noiseprint-
distance. Again, the performance of the conventional me-
Combining PRNU and noiseprint for robust and efficient device source identification 7
thod is very good in the ideal case, but worsens significantly
in more challenging situations, and is only slightly better
than random choice when N=1 and d=64. On the contrary,
noiseprint-only identification is never very good, since there
are always from 2 to 5 indistinguishable devices for each
model, but remains remarkably stable in all conditions, sug-
gesting that models keep being identified accurately, with
only minor impairments even in the most challenging cases.
In the following column we show a third reference, called
“ideal”, which represents an upper bound for the perfor-
mance of the proposed approach. Here, we assume perfect
model identification, and rely on the PRNU-based distance
only for the final choice in the restricted set of same-model
cameras. In the most favourable case (d=1024, N=100) the
PRNU-only performance was already quite good, and only
a marginal improvement is observed. Likewise, in the worst
case (d=64, N=1), PRNU is unreliable, and the fusion im-
proves only marginally upon the noiseprint-only performance.
However, in intermediate cases, large improvements are ob-
served, with the accuracy growing from 0.649 to 0.793 (case
d=1024, N=1) or from 0.342 to 0.610 (d=64, N=100). This
performance gain fully justifies our interest for this approach,
we only need the proposed methods to work relatively close
to this upper bound.
In the following five columns we report results for the
various versions of the proposed method, based on support
vector machine classifier (SVM), likelihood ratio test with
ML estimation (LRT) and robust estimation (r-LRT) of pa-
rameters, and Fisher’s linear discriminant in the same two
versions (FLD and r-FLD). Results are fully satisfactory.
Taking for example the FLD column, the gap with respect to
the ideal reference remains quite small in all cases of inter-
est and, consequently, a large improvement is observed with
respect to the conventional method. This confirms that the
noiseprint-based model classification remains largely suc-
cessful in most conditions, and helps improving the overall
performance. As for the various versions of the proposed
approach, there seems to be no consistent winner, with FLD
providing slightly better results, on the average, and SVM
showing an isolated bad point (d=1024, N=1) maybe due to
some overfitting. In particular, the nonlinear decision bound-
ary of the LRT criterion does not seem to ensure improve-
ments over the linear boundaries of SVM and FLD, confirm-
ing that the two classes are linearly well separated in the
feature space. The versions based on robust estimation of
parameters performs on par or slightly worse than the ML
counterparts.
Tab.3, structurally identical to Tab.2, provides results for
the open-set scenario in terms of area under the ROC curve
(AUC). All considerations made for the closed-set scenario
keep holding here. Of course, numbers are much larger than
before, because we are considering binary decisions, where
an AUC of 0.5 is equivalent to coin tossing and good re-
sults correspond to AUC’s close to 1. This is actually the
case for the proposed method. Considering again the FLD
column, the AUC is never less than 0.935 and not far from
that of the ideal reference, while it is often much larger than
the AUC of the conventional method. Actually, it is worth
emphasizing that also the noiseprint-only method has quite
good performance indicators. In hindsight, this is not too
surprising. This scenario, in fact, fits the case of large-scale
analysis, where a very large number of candidate sources
must be considered. Perfect model identification allows one
to reject right away most of the candidates (small PFA, large
AUC), which allows one to focus on a limited set of candi-
dates, to be analyzed with greater care and resources. Like
before, differences among the various versions of the pro-
posal are negligible.
The next four tables refer to the case of images com-
pressed using JPEG, with QF=90 (Tab.4 and Tab.5) and with
QF=80 (Tab. 6 and Tab.7) always for both the closed-set and
open-set scenarios. First of all, with reference to the closed-
set scenario, let us analyze the performance of the conven-
tional method as the image quality impairs. Only in the ideal
case the accuracy is fully satisfactory, while it decreases dra-
matically in all other conditions, for example, from 0.649
(uncompressed) to 0.364 (QF=80), for (d=1024, N=1). In
fact, the JPEG compression filters out as noise most of the
small traces on which source identification methods rely.
This is also true for the noiseprint traces. However, in the
same case as before, with the robust-FLD version, the pro-
posed method keeps granting an accuracy of 0.540, with a
more limited loss from the 0.752 accuracy of uncompressed
images, and a large gain with respect to the conventional
method. The same behavior is observed, with random fluc-
tuations, in all other cases, and also in the open-set scenario,
so we refrain from a tedious detailed analysis. However, it is
worth pointing out that, in the presence of compression, the
versions based on robust estimation (r-LRT and r-FLD) pro-
vide a consistent, and often significant, improvement over
those relying on ML estimation.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed to use noiseprint, a camera-model
image fingerprint, to support PRNU-based forensic analy-
ses. Numerical experiments prove that the proposed approach
ensures a significant performance improvement in several
challenging situations easily encountered in real-world ap-
plications.
This is only a first step in this direction, and there is cer-
tainly much room for further improvements. In future work
we want to extend the proposed approach to improve PRNU-
based image forgery detection and localization, and also to
perform accurate blind image clustering, an important prob-
lem in multimedia forensics.
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d N PRNU NP ideal SVM LRT r-LRT FLD r-FLD
1 0.044 0.233 0.331 0.255 0.240 0.238 0.258 0.256
64 10 0.117 0.259 0.422 0.368 0.348 0.358 0.351 0.341
100 0.342 0.282 0.610 0.570 0.557 0.565 0.563 0.557
1 0.191 0.261 0.485 0.405 0.397 0.408 0.430 0.429
256 10 0.500 0.272 0.721 0.683 0.664 0.662 0.692 0.689
100 0.814 0.289 0.904 0.881 0.868 0.867 0.882 0.882
1 0.649 0.270 0.793 0.532 0.733 0.735 0.751 0.752
1024 10 0.901 0.294 0.952 0.888 0.910 0.907 0.913 0.919
100 0.953 0.321 0.975 0.955 0.954 0.954 0.952 0.953
Table 2 Accuracy on the Dresden dataset in the closed-set scenario without compression (random-choice accuracy is 0.016). Here and in next
tables, the best fusion results are in boldface. When they improve by 20% or more over PRNU, they are emphasized with a green background.
Large improvements are observed when there is data scarcity (small d, small N). All classifiers have quite similar performances.
d N PRNU NP ideal SVM LRT r-LRT FLD r-FLD
1 0.580 0.937 0.980 0.938 0.932 0.932 0.935 0.933
64 10 0.678 0.951 0.983 0.952 0.951 0.952 0.942 0.938
100 0.826 0.954 0.989 0.961 0.962 0.962 0.959 0.957
1 0.742 0.946 0.985 0.949 0.945 0.946 0.945 0.944
256 10 0.880 0.956 0.992 0.965 0.966 0.966 0.968 0.967
100 0.960 0.959 0.997 0.980 0.978 0.978 0.979 0.979
1 0.906 0.949 0.994 0.952 0.964 0.964 0.964 0.965
1024 10 0.981 0.958 0.999 0.971 0.981 0.979 0.980 0.983
100 0.989 0.960 0.999 0.984 0.983 0.983 0.982 0.983
Table 3 AUC on the Dresden dataset in the open-set scenario without compression (random-choice AUC is 0.5). Again, large improvements are
observed in the presence of small patches and a small number of reference images. Also in the case, classifiers perform about equally well.
d N PRNU NP ideal SVM LRT r-LRT FLD r-FLD
1 0.034 0.178 0.308 0.189 0.130 0.165 0.173 0.189
64 10 0.074 0.234 0.387 0.273 0.202 0.247 0.217 0.273
100 0.238 0.225 0.558 0.440 0.399 0.443 0.404 0.458
1 0.108 0.219 0.424 0.303 0.212 0.255 0.262 0.298
256 10 0.369 0.261 0.648 0.578 0.510 0.562 0.562 0.579
100 0.738 0.268 0.877 0.845 0.823 0.833 0.847 0.834
1 0.527 0.249 0.737 0.547 0.602 0.635 0.664 0.647
1024 10 0.855 0.301 0.936 0.879 0.885 0.892 0.900 0.873
100 0.948 0.313 0.974 0.952 0.948 0.948 0.947 0.926
Table 4 Accuracy on the Dresden dataset in the closed-set scenario with compression (QF=90). All performance figures lower significantly with
respect to uncompressed images. Fusion keeps providing large gains in the most challenging case.
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